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act, what happens to bond
yields?  There are good theo-
retical reasons why shorter-
term bond yields should be
affected by monetary policy.  Open market
operations of the Federal Reserve System have
an immediate effect on the federal funds rate,
which is the interest rate charged for overnight
interbank loans.  Since short-term borrowing
(such as a one-month loan) acts as a reason-
ably close substitute for overnight borrowing,
an increase in the federal funds rate should be
accompanied by an increase in other short-
term interest rates.  However, it is less clear
why monetary policy should have a significant
effect on five-, ten-, and 15-year bond yields.
It seems doubtful that five-year loans are close
substitutes for overnight borrowing.  Yet,
casual observation suggests that monetary
policy actions are associated with changes in
long-term bond yields.
Consider the bond market debacle of
1994.  Publications ranging from Barron’s to
the Los Angeles Times argue that 1994 was the
worst year for the bond market since the
1920s.   In figure 1, we display the one-year
holding period returns for zero-coupon bonds
of four years, six years, and ten years in matu-
rity.1  (The vertical lines toward the right-hand
side of each panel indicate January 1994.)  If
we exclude the volatile period from 1979–82
(when the Federal Reserve experimented with
direct targeting of monetary aggregates), the
one-year cumulative losses in late 1994 were
among the worst of the postwar period.  This
collapse of bond prices took its toll on well-
known bond investors:  Michael Steinhart’s
hedge fund sustained losses of 30.5 percent in
1994, George Soros’s fell 4.6 percent, and
Julian Robertson’s fell 8.7 percent—all com-
ing off very strong performances in 1993.
At the same time, 1994 was a period of
concerted monetary tightening.  After a period
during which the federal funds rate was excep-
tionally low and stable, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) raised the funds
rate rapidly.  As shown in figure 2, the 18
months from mid-1992 through the end of
1993 were characterized by a federal funds
rate near 3 percent, with very little variability.
This period more closely resembles the mid-
1960s than the more volatile 1970s and 1980s.
From February 1994 through February 1995,
the FOMC doubled its target for the funds rate
from 3 percent to 6 percent in seven incre-
ments.  Figure 2 shows that this sort of mone-
tary tightening is hardly unusual (even exclud-
ing the 1979–82 period, when the federal
funds rate was not the monetary policy instru-
ment).  Nonetheless, the congruence of these
two events (the rapid tightening of monetary
policy and the precipitous rise in long-term
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bond yields) led some to assert that the col-
lapse in the bond market was policy induced.
For example, the Wall Street Journal of
December 13, 1995 graphically describes
February 1994 as the month “when the Fed
began raising short-term interest rates and set
off the year’s bond-market slaughter.”
In this article, we will look at the relation-
ship between monetary policy and long rates
during the postwar period, and then apply
what we learn to the extraordinary events of
1994.  To examine how a monetary policy
action (such as an increase in the federal funds
rate) affects the yields of bonds with differing
maturities, we must confront the problem of
causality.  For example, suppose we find that
a tightening of monetary policy is associated
with higher long-term bond yields.  Can we
then infer that tighter monetary policy causes
higher yields?  Not necessarily.  It is generally
believed that the FOMC tends to tighten mon-
etary policy when there are indicators of future
inflation.  It is also believed that expectations
of higher inflation tend to increase current
bond yields.  The positive correlation be-
tween tighter money and higher yields could
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be evidence that the Fed causes yields to in-
crease when it tightens money, or it could be
evidence that both the Fed action and the high-
er yields are jointly caused by forecasts of
higher inflation.2
To help us disentangle the various possible
directions of causality, we use a framework
developed by Lawrence Christiano, Martin
Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans in a series of
working papers published by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago.3  In the Christiano-
Eichenbaum-Evans (CEE) framework, a clear
distinction is made between the monetary au-
thority’s  feedback rule and an exogenous mone-
tary policy shock.  The feedback rule relates
policymakers’ actions to the state of the econo-
my.4  In the example of the preceding paragraph,
the “normal” reaction of the Fed to an increase in
inflation expectations would be incorporated into
the feedback rule.  The exogenous monetary
policy shock is defined as the deviation of actual
policy from the feedback rule.  We refer to these
policy shocks as “exogenous” because, by con-
struction, they do not respond in any systematic
way to the economic variables that are included
in the feedback rule.  (If certain realizations of
these variables systematically implied a higher-
than-average or lower-than-average policy
shock, then the rule is incompletely specified:
Any systematic linkage between the policy-
shock component and the feedback-rule compo-
nent should have been loaded into the feedback
rule in the first place.)
We measure monetary
policy by the level of the federal
funds rate.  We use the CEE
framework to decompose chang-
es in the funds rate into the feed-
back-rule component and the
policy-shock component, and
we ask how bond yields respond
to an exogenous monetary poli-
cy shock.  By focusing on the
policy-shock component, we
resolve the problem of ambiguous
causality:  Since the policy shock
is exogenous by construction,
causality can only flow from the
policy shock to the bond yields
(and to the other variables in the
economy).  However, this resolu-
tion is not without cost:  We can-
not ask how a change in the struc-
ture of the feedback rule itself would affect the
behavior of long-term bond yields.  The prob-
lem is that all observed economic relations are
conditional on the particular feedback rule in
place. [This is an application of the celebrated
Lucas (1976) critique.]
To explore the consequences of a change in
the feedback rule, one would have to specify
a model of the bond market at the level of
investor preferences, monetary policy objec-
tives, technological constraints, and market
structure.  We do not attempt this potentially
useful but extremely difficult modeling task
in this article.
Once we determine the response of bond
yields to an exogenous monetary policy shock,
we can look at the events of 1994 through this
lens: (1) To what extent was the monetary tight-
ening in 1994 an application of the FOMC’s
prevailing feedback rule, and to what extent
did it reflect exogenous shocks to monetary
policy?; and (2) To what extent did policy
shocks affect long-term bond yields during this
period?  In particular, if there were no policy
shocks (that is, if the monetary authority had
followed the feedback rule exactly), would the
increase in bond yields have been substantially
reduced?
Below, we describe the CEE framework
and how it is used to investigate the behavior of
long-term bond yields.  We then detail the
average response of bond yields to exogenous
monetary policy shocks.  Our analysis indicatesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 5
that these policy shocks have a substantial
impact only on short-term bond yields; the
impact on maturities longer than three years is
quite small, and the impact on maturities long-
er than 15 years is insignificant.  We consider
two theoretical explanations for these results:
the expectations hypothesis of the term struc-
ture and the Fisher hypothesis that movements
in long-term bond yields reflect changes in
expected inflation.  We find that the response
of long yields to exogenous monetary policy
shocks closely follows the predictions of the
expectations hypothesis, while the Fisher hy-
pothesis explains very little.  We then apply
our methodology to the 1994 period.
A framework for analyzing the effects
of monetary policy on bond yields
The model we use for exploring the effects
of monetary policy shocks is the version of the
CEE framework with monthly data discussed
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994b,
section 5).  We include four types of variables
in our model.  The first is the monetary policy
instrument.  We assume that this policy instru-
ment is the federal funds rate.  Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994b) also explore
the use of nonborrowed reserves as an alterna-
tive policy instrument.  They obtain stronger
results with the federal funds rate, but their
results are fairly robust to the choice of instru-
ment.  The second type of variable is contem-
poraneous inputs to the feedback rule.  We
assume that this feedback rule incorporates
contemporaneous values of the log of nonagri-
cultural employment, as measured by the es-
tablishment survey (EM),  the log of the price
level, as measured by the personal consump-
tion expenditure deflator (PCED), and the
change in an index of sensitive materials pric-
es (CHGSMP).5  We use EM as a monthly
indicator of real economic activity.  We mea-
sure the price level by PCED, rather than by
the consumer price index (CPI), because the
CPI is a fixed-weight deflator.  Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994b) discuss cer-
tain anomalous patterns that emerge when a
fixed-weight deflator is used to gauge the
price level.6  These patterns are less of a prob-
lem when a variable-weight measure of con-
sumer prices, such as PCED, is used.
Finally, the CHGSMP series is a good pre-
dictor of future inflationary pressure.  Some
such predictor must be included if we are to
construct a plausible representation of the
Fed’s feedback rule.
The third type of variable we include is
the yield on a zero-coupon bond with T peri-
ods to maturity (YT); we rotate, one at a time,
through maturities from one month to 29
years.7   We use yields on zero-coupon bonds
to avoid complications associated with coupon
payments.  The yields from 1947 to 1991 are
monthly data taken from J. Huston McCulloch
and Heon-Chul Kwon (1993).8  For the period
1991 through 1995, we use yields on Treasury
STRIPS quoted in the Wall Street Journal for
the first business day of each month.   Finally,
we include additional explanatory variables
for long-term yields.  In this category of vari-
ables, we use the log of nonborrowed reserves
(NBR) and the log of total reserves (TR).
We use these variables as measures of the
demand for credit in the economy.  In partic-
ular, the amount of nonborrowed reserves
that must be injected or withdrawn to achieve
a given federal funds target is determined by
the price elasticity of demand for reserves.
By including total reserves as well as nonbor-
rowed reserves, we measure the component
of reserve demand that is accommodated
through the discount window.9
The resulting model includes seven indi-
vidual variables: EM, PCED, CHGSMP, FF,
NBR, TR, and Y T.  We assume that the mone-
tary policymakers’ feedback rule is a linear
function of (1) contemporaneous values of
EMt, PCEDt, and CHGSMPt, and (2) lagged
values of  all variables in the economy.  That
is, the Federal Reserve sets policy based on
current economic activity (as measured by
EMt) and price movements (as measured by
PCEDt and CHGSMPt), as well as the entire
history of the economy.  The policy decision,
in turn, has a contemporaneous effect on re-
serves and bond yields and affects the future
realizations of all variables in the economy.
Some argument could be made for including
interest rates in the feedback rule, but there is
statistical and economic justification for mod-
eling the influence in the other direction.
Cook and Hahn (1989) find that even on a
daily basis there is little evidence of system-
atic movements in interest rates prior to an
announcement of a change in the federal funds
rate, while there are systematic movements
after such an announcement.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 6
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Note: For each bond, the black line traces the response path over 24 months following the shock.  The colored
lines above and below the response give the 95 percent confidence bands, computed by Monte Carlo
simulation using 1,000 independent draws.
Sources: Calculations from authors’ statistical model, using the following data series: U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics—employment survey measurements of nonagricultural employment (EM); U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis—personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCED) and index of sensitive materials prices (CHGSMP);
McColloch and Kwon (1993) augmented with data from Wall Street Journal 1991-95, various issues (YT); and
Federal Reserve Board—federal funds rate (FF), nonborrowed reserves (NBR), and total reserves (TR).
the residuals from the equations for EM,
PCED, and CHGSMP.  The exogenous mone-
tary policy shock is that portion of the residual
in the FF equation that is not correlated with
this estimated feedback rule.  The technical
appendix to this article describes in detail how
we set up and estimate this VAR, and how we
use the VAR to infer the exogenous policy-
shock component of FF.
We estimate this linear feedback rule as
part of a vector autoregression (VAR) system.
Formally, the system consists of seven equa-
tions.  Each equation in the system takes one
of the seven variables to be its dependent
variable.  For each equation, the independent
variables are lagged values of all seven vari-
ables.  The feedback rule consists of the fitted
equation for FF, plus a linear combination ofFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 7
In addition to the exogenous monetary
policy shock, our model incorporates exoge-
nous shocks to the other six variables.  That is,
there are a total of seven shock processes that
act as the fundamental exogenous driving pro-
cesses in the economy.  These exogenous pro-
cesses are transformations of the residuals from
our seven VAR regressions.  In particular, the
exogenous shocks are serially uncorrelated, and
are constructed to be mutually uncorrelated.
(The technical appendix describes how we can
isolate the effects of these seven exogenous
processes.)  Unexpected movement in any
variable in the economy must be attributable to
the effect of one or more of these exogenous
processes.  Below, we investigate how much of
the unexpected movement in FF and YT can be
attributed to the exogenous shocks to each of
the seven variables in the model.
The response of bond yields to
exogenous monetary policy shocks
Figure 3 plots the estimated responses of
bond yields to a one-standard-deviation exoge-
nous monetary policy shock. This corresponds
to an increase in the federal funds rate of ap-
proximately 50 basis points.10  We display the
responses for bond maturities of one month,
six months, one year, three years, ten years,
and 15 years.  The colored lines delineate
95 percent confidence interval bands.11  The
plots trace the responses over 24 months.
A 50-basis-point federal
funds shock increases the one-
month rate by approximately 30
basis points in the period when
the shock occurs.  This response
is highly significant statistically.
The one-month rate continues to
climb in the following period, and
then falls, with the effect of the
shock completely attenuated after
21 months.  The six-month and
one-year rates display qualitative-
ly similar response patterns, al-
though the magnitude of the re-
sponse decreases for the longer-
term bonds.  When we move to
longer-term bonds, the initial
effect diminishes substantially as
maturity increases:  The initial
response of the three-year bond is
only 12 basis points, and the re-
sponses of the ten- and 15-year
bonds are each less than 5 basis points.  Ac-
cording to the point estimates, the response
of the longer-term bonds appears more per-
sistent than that of the shorter-term bonds.
However, this apparent persistence is not
statistically significant:  The initial response
for the ten- and 15-year bonds is barely sig-
nificant; the response to a federal funds shock
of all bonds longer than 15 years is insignifi-
cant at the 5 percent marginal significance
level.  For all maturities, the response is in-
significant by one year.  Interestingly, these
results are roughly comparable to Cook and
Hahn’s (1989) estimates of the effects on
interest rates of a publicly announced change
in the federal funds rate.  They find that in
response to a 100-basis-point increase, short
rates rise about 50 basis points, while long
rates rise about 10 basis points.
The results are straightforward:  There is a
significant and relatively large effect on the
short rates, with a decreasing, less significant
effect at longer maturities.  The effect on the
term structure can perhaps be seen more easily
by plotting the effect of a contractionary shock
on the yield curve.  The black line in figure 4
is the average yield curve from 1990 through
1995, for maturities up to five years.  The
remaining lines show our point estimates for
the response of the yield curve to a one-stan-
dard-deviation exogenous monetary policy
FIGURE 4
The effect of a one-standard-deviation federal














Sources: See figure 3.
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shock after one month, six months,
one year, and two years.  To illus-
trate the qualitative patterns more
clearly over a wider range of matu-
rities, figure 5 displays a similar
plot for a five-standard-deviation
monetary shock, with maturities up
to 29 years.  These plots clearly
show that the impact on the term
structure is a rise in shorter rates,
with the effect diminishing as
maturities increase.  In other
words, a monetary policy shock
raises the level, flattens the slope,
and decreases the curvature of the
yield curve.
Why do monetary policy
shocks affect yields?  What gener-
ates the observed response in
yields of different maturities to a
monetary policy shock?  We con-
sider two well-known hypotheses:
the expectations hypothesis, which states that
the long yield is an average of expected future
short yields, and a version of the Fisher hy-
pothesis, which states that changes in long
yields are largely determined by changes in
expected inflation.
The expectations hypothesis
The expectations hypothesis can be written
1)
Equation 1 says that the long yield, Yt
T, on
a T-period zero-coupon bond is the average of
expected future yields on one-period bonds
over the next T periods, plus a time-invariant
term premium, TPT.  The expectations hy-
pothesis is attractive, because it implies that
changes in forward interest rates should pro-
vide unbiased forecasts of changes in future
spot rates.  Unfortunately, tests of equation 1
using postwar U.S. data tend to decisively
reject the hypothesis.  For example, the equa-
tion implies that changes in the term spread
Yt
T – Yt
1 should predict future yield changes
Yt+1
T–1 – Yt
T.  That is, in the following regression
2)
FIGURE 5
The effect of a five-standard-deviation federal



















t+i + TPT. Yt
T
Y T–1     – Y T
t =  a  + b   [Y T
t –Y1
t]+e t+1 t+1
the slope coefficient b should equal unity.
Campbell and Shiller (1991) show that, for
numerous data samples and numerous maturi-
ties T, this slope coefficient is significantly
negative.  McCallum (1994) suggests that the
Campbell-Shiller regressions may be problem-
atic econometrically in the presence of activist
monetary policy.  If the term premium TPT
displays only a small degree of time variation
(so the expectations hypothesis holds approxi-
mately), but the monetary authority observes
and responds to this time variation in TPT, then
et+1 may  be correlated with Yt
T – Yt
1.  This
could bias the slope coefficient b downward.
McCallum gives examples where the resulting
bias is sufficient to explain the Campbell-
Shiller results.
In our impulse response functions, the
expectations hypothesis would predict that
the one-step-ahead response of Yt
T should
equal the average of the first T-period-ahead
responses of the short rate Yt
1.  The Camp-
bell-Shiller results suggest that the expecta-
tions hypothesis may perform poorly as an
explanation of our impulse responses.  On
the other hand, our framework may not be
vulnerable to McCallum’s critique, since we
model monetary policy explicitly.  If the
variables entering the feedback rule include
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of its effect on the expected
future price level:  The first-
period response of Yt
T should
equal the T-period-ahead re-
sponse of the price level PCEDt.
There is substantial evidence
against a literal one-to-one rela-
tionship between changes in
expected inflation and changes in
shorter-term interest rates.13
However, it is not implausible
that fluctuations in expected
inflation are reflected, at least in
part, in longer-term bond yields.
To investigate this idea within
our framework, we ask how
much of the response of long
yields to a monetary shock can be
explained by the corresponding
response in expected inflation.
That portion of the response that
cannot be tied to expected infla-
tion would be attributable to
liquidity effects, of the type described in Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
We assume that the impulse response of
the price level is a good proxy, under rational
expectations, for expected inflation following
a shock in monetary policy.  In figure 7, we
display the response of our measure of the
price level, PCED, to a one-standard-devia-
tion contractionary shock to monetary policy.
In figure 8, we display the difference be-
tween the first-step response of Yt
T and the
T-step-ahead response of PCEDt, divided by
T in years, for maturities T ranging from two
months through fifteen years.  Unlike the
expectations hypothesis, the Fisher hypothe-
sis offers little explanation for our impulse
responses.  For all maturities, the difference
between the first-period response of the bond
yields and the response predicted by the Fish-
er hypothesis is significantly different from
zero.  Furthermore, the point estimates of
these differences are fairly large, between
10 and 20 basis points.  To see the source of
this failure, compare figure 7 with figure 3.
Figure 7 displays the response of the price
level PCED to a one-standard-deviation mon-
etary policy shock, along with the 95 percent
confidence intervals.  Initially, a monetary
contraction is followed by a small (barely
FIGURE 6
Expectations hypothesis
then our regressions will not display the
McCallum bias.
In figure 6, we display the difference
between the first-step response of Yt
T and the
average of the first T-step responses of Yt
1,
for T ranging from two months through
15 years.  (The methodology used to con-
struct the confidence intervals is described in
the technical appendix.)  According to this
figure, the expectations hypothesis does a
good job of explaining the impulse-response
patterns.  For all maturities, the difference
between the first-period response of the long
bond and the response predicted by the ex-
pectations hypothesis is less than 6 basis
points, and is insignificant at the 5 percent
marginal significance level.
The Fisher hypothesis
There is a school of thought that a good
deal of the variation in very long-term bond
yields is due to changes in expected inflation.
An extreme version of this idea is the Fisher
hypothesis, which asserts that the nominal
bond yield Yt
T should move, one for one, with
changes in inflation expected over the life of
the bond (that is, over the next T periods.)12
Under this hypothesis, the only reason a mone-
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difference in basis points
maturity in years
Note: For maturities T ranging from two months through 15 years, the
black line plots resp1 (YT)–   S T
i=1 respi, (Y1), where respi (Y j) denotes
the response of Y j
t+i (the yield on a j-period bond in period t+i) to a
one-standard-deviation exogenous monetary policy shock in period t.
The colored lines display 95 percent confidence bands.
Sources:  See figure 3.
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policy shock is positive.  We
find essentially no evidence that
the response of long yields to an
exogenous monetary shock is
due to that shock’s effect on
expectations of future inflation.
In summary, we find that a
contractionary exogenous shock
to monetary policy has a strong
upward impact on the one-
month rate.  One-month loans
are a partial substitute for over-
night borrowing, so it would be
surprising if the one-month rate
did not respond strongly to an
increase in the federal funds
rate.  The impact of a shock to
monetary policy on longer-bond
yields declines with maturity,
with this decline well explained
by the expectations hypothesis.
That is, the declining impact of
a monetary policy shock on longer-maturity
yields tracks the rate at which the response of
the one-month yield attenuates.  We find no
evidence of an excessive response of long
yields to monetary innovations.  At the same
time, changes in expected inflation do not
appear to account for the observed responses.
Monetary policy and bond
yields in 1994
We use the results from the
model to examine the behavior
of monetary policy and the bond
markets in 1994.  Taking the
VAR estimates as given, we
decompose the movement of the
federal funds rate and bond
yields into the following:
(1) the expected path, given
information known in December
1993; (2) the unexpected move-
ment attributable to the exoge-
nous monetary policy shocks;
and (3) the unexpected move-
ment attributable to exogenous
shocks to the other variables in
the economy.
We first look at the deter-
minants of the federal funds
rate.  Panel A of figure 9 shows
FIGURE 7
The effect of a fed funds shock on the price level
FIGURE 8
The Fisher hypothesis
T ranging from two months through 15 years, the black line
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monetary policy in period t. The colored lines display 95 percent confidence bands.
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Sources: See figure 3.
significant) rise in the price level.14  The
price level eventually falls in response to a
monetary policy shock.  Under the Fisher
hypothesis, this would imply a negative
response of the longer-maturity yields to a
monetary contraction.  However, the esti-
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Note: The black line represents the response to an exogenous monetary
policy shock. The colored lines represent 95 percent confidence bands.
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the decomposition of the federal funds rate
when the VAR includes the one-month yield.
Panel B shows the analogous decomposition
when the VAR includes the six-month
yield.15  For both models, the expected path
for the federal funds rate is flat.  In contrast,
the actual federal funds rate rises approxi-
mately 300 basis points from January 1994
through April 1995.
What accounts for this dramatic, unex-
pected tightening of monetary policy?  By
construction, the only sources of unexpected
movements in the monetary policy are the
exogenous policy shocks, and the effect of
other economic shocks acting through the
feedback rule.  Figure 9 shows
the relative importance of these
two components.  According to
panel A of figure 9, the policy
shocks account for virtually
none of the unexpected run-up in
the federal funds rate.  Panel B
of figure 9 indicates the exoge-
nous policy shocks actually pull
the federal funds rate below the
expected path.  It follows, there-
fore, that the increase in the
federal funds rate must be due
to the workings of the feedback
rule.  In particular, figure 9
indicates that most of the move-
ment in the federal funds rate
above the baseline forecast
represents a response of the
feedback rule to unexpected
increases in sensitive materials
prices.  In both panels of figure
9, the line giving the path of the
federal funds rate that would
have obtained if all shocks other
than shocks to CHGSMP were
set equal to zero is very close to
the path actually observed.
Recall that lagged values of
the bond yield enter the feed-
back rule for monetary policy.
Figure 9 documents the effect of
shocks to the bond yield on the
path of the federal funds rate.
With the one-month bond (panel
A of the figure), the exogenous
shocks to the one-month yield
have a rather small effect on the funds rate.
When the six-month yield is used (panel B),
the exogenous shocks in the bond yield do
tend to push the funds rate above the expected
path, but this effect is largely offset by the
estimated exogenous monetary policy
shocks.16  The contributions from the inputs to
the monetary policy rule other than the bond
yield and CHGSMP are relatively small, so
they are not plotted in figure 9.
Our analysis indicates that the rise in the
federal funds rate during 1994 and the first
few months of 1995 was largely a mechanical
response of the feedback rule to an increased
FIGURE 9






















B. Vector autoregression including six-month yield





Only one-month yield shocks




Only six-month yield shocks
Sources: See figure 3.
CHGSMP shocks
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15-year yield.  However, virtual-
ly none of this increase can be
attributed to exogenous mone-
tary policy shocks.  In figure 11,
we plot the path of each yield
that would have obtained if the
feedback rule were followed
strictly.  (That is, if the exoge-
nous monetary shocks were all
set equal to zero.)  For each
bond, the path is virtually un-
changed.
We can use our VAR model
to explain the deviation of the
bond yields from their expected
paths.  While some of these
unexpected yield changes are a
result of exogenous shocks to
changes in sensitive materials
prices (and, to a lesser degree,
the remaining series in the mod-
el), for the most part, the unexpected move-
ment in long bond yields is caused by exoge-
nous shocks to the bond yields themselves.
This is shown in figure 12.   In each panel,
the line tracing the path the bond yield would
have taken if all shocks other than the own-
shock to the yield itself were set to zero
closely follows the movement in the bond
yield.  We interpret the exogenous shocks to
the bond yields as shocks to financial markets
that are unrelated to real economic activity
(as measured by the employment variable
EMt), price changes, or monetary policy.  The
only other exogenous shock series that had a
major impact on long-bond yields during this
period is the shock to the change in sensitive
materials prices.  Our interpretation of the
results in figure 12 is that the collapse in bond
prices during 1994 was due, in part, to early
warning signs of future inflation.  However,
this extraordinary movement in bond prices
was largely due to factors that are unrelated
to the economic or policy variables included
in our model.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
We find that there is a substantial re-
sponse of one-month bond yields to an ex-
ogenous monetary policy shock, which dies
out monotonically in about 20 months.
FIGURE 10
















Sources: See figure 3.
threat of inflation.  In our model, the mone-
tary authority incorporates the series
CHGSMP as a warning indicator of potential
inflationary pressures.  In 1994, this series
took a pronounced and unexpected upswing.
In figure 10, we display the actual CHGSMP
series, along with the expected path of the
series conditional on December 1993 infor-
mation.   Note that the growth rate in sensi-
tive materials prices increases from 0.5 per-
cent to 2.5 percent over the year, while the
expected path does not even rise above 1
percent.  Note that the line displaying the
path the series would have taken if all shocks
except the own-shocks to the CHGSMP series
were set to zero closely tracks the actual
series, implying that virtually all of this in-
crease is attributable to the exogenous shocks
to the CHGSMP series itself.
Were the increases in bond yields in
1994 and 1995 predictable?  If not, why not?
Figure 11 shows the historical decomposi-
tions for the one- and six-month yields, as
well as the one-, three-, ten-, and 15-year
yields.  In all cases, the expected paths for
the yields conditional on December 1993
information are flat.  In contrast, all of these
yields increased substantially during 1994.
The increases range from approximately
300 basis points for the one-month yield
to approximately 180 basis points for theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 13
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Sources: See figure 3.
Longer-term bond yields respond more or less
as predicted by the expectations hypothesis:
the initial month’s response of a T-month
bond’s yield is approximately equal to the
average of the first T months’ response of the
one-month bond.  This pattern implies that
longer-term bond yields have much weaker
responses to an exogenous monetary shock.
While these results are intuitive, they stand
in sharp contrast to claims that long-bond
yields react excessively to monetary policy
innovations. We find no evidence that mone-
tary policy shocks have any detectable effect
on long-term bond yields.
When we apply these results to the dra-
matic events of 1994, we find no deviations
from the general pattern.  The substantial
increase in long-term bond yields in 1994
cannot be attributed to exogenous monetary
policy shocks.  Indeed, the only evidence that
might be interpreted as relating monetary
policy to movements in long yields is theECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14
FIGURE 12
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sensitive materials prices
Sources: See figure 3.
impact of sensitive materials prices on both
the federal funds rate and long yields.  This
could be evidence that increases in sensitive
materials prices affected monetary policy
through the feedback rule, and that this com-
ponent of monetary policy might have had
some impact on long yields.  However, it is
also possible that the change in sensitive
materials prices affected long bond yields
directly, rather than indirectly through the
policy rule.  For the reasons described in the
introduction, there is no way we can disen-
tangle these two pathways without a structur-
al model.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 15
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
To isolate exogenous monetary policy
shocks, we use the vector autoregression
(VAR) procedure developed by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b).  Let Zt
denote the 7 x 1 vector of all variables in the
model at date t.  This vector includes the federal
funds rate, which we assume is the monetary
policy instrument, all inputs into the feedback
rule, the long-bond yield being studied, and
measures of nonborrowed reserves and total
reserves.  The order of the variables is:
A1)  Zt  =  (EMt, PCEDt, CHGSMPt, FFt,
NBRt, TRt, Yt
T )¢.
We assume that Zt follows a sixth-order VAR:
A2) Zt  = A0  +  A1Zt–1  +  A2Zt–2  +  ...  +
A6Zt–6  +  ut,
where Ai = 0,1, ... , 6 are 7 x 7 coefficient
matrices, and the 7 x 1 disturbance vector ut is
serially uncorrelated.  We assume that the
fundamental exogenous process that drives the
economy is a 7 x 1 vector process {et} of
serially uncorrelated shocks, with a covariance
matrix equal to the identity matrix.  The VAR
disturbance vector ut is a linear function of a
vector et of underlying economic shocks, as
follows:
A3) ut
   =  C et,
where the 7 x 7 matrix C is the unique lower-
triangular decomposition of the covariance
matrix of ut:
A4) CC¢ = E [ ut ut¢ ].
This structure implies that the jth element of ut
is correlated with the first j elements of et, but
is orthogonal to the remaining elements of et.
In setting policy, the Federal Reserve both
reacts to the economy and affects the econo-
my; we use the VAR structure to capture these
cross-directional relationships.  We assume
that the feedback rule can be written as a lin-
ear function Y defined over a vector Wt of
variables observed at or before date t.  That is,
if we let FFt denote the federal funds rate, then
monetary policy is completely described by:
A5) FFt  =  Y(Wt)  +  c4,4e4t,
where e4t is the fourth element of the funda-
mental shock vector et, and c4,4 is the (4,4)th
element of the matrix C.  (Recall that FFt is
the fourth element of Zt.)  In equation A5,
Y(W t) is the feedback-rule component of
monetary policy, and c4,4 e4t is the exogenous
monetary policy shock.  Since e4t has unit
variance, c4,4 is the standard deviation of this
policy shock.  Following Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (1994), we model Wt as
containing lagged values (dated t –1 and earli-
er) of all variables in the model, as well as
time t values of those variables the monetary
authority looks at contemporaneously in set-
ting policy.  In accordance with the assump-
tions of the feedback rule, an exogenous shock
e4t to monetary policy cannot contemporaneous-
ly affect time t values of the elements of Wt.
However, lagged values of e4t can affect the
variables in Wt.
We incorporate equation A5 into the VAR
structure A2 through A3.  Variables EM,
PCED, and CHGSMP are the contemporane-
ous inputs to the monetary feedback rule.
These are the only components of W t that are
not determined prior to date t.  The variables
in the model that are not contemporaneous
inputs to monetary policy but which do affect
the long-yield under study are NBR and TR.
Finally, the last element of Zt is the long yield.
With this structure, we can identify the right-
hand side of equation A5 with the fourth equa-
tion in the VAR equation A2: Y(Wt) equals the
fourth row of A0 + A1Zt–1 + A2Zt–2 + ... + A6 Zt–6,
plus S3
i=1 c4i eit (where c4i denotes the (4,i)th
element of matrix C, and eit denotes the ith
element of et).  Note that FFt is correlated with
the first four elements of et but is uncorrelated
with the remaining elements of et.  By con-
struction, the shock c4,4e4t to monetary policy
is uncorrelated with Wt.
We estimate matrices Ai,i = 0,1, ... , 6 and
C by ordinary least squares.  The response of
any variable in Zt to an impulse in any element
of the fundamental shock vector et can then be
computed by using equations A2 and A3.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16
The standard-error bands in figures 3, 7,
and 8 are computed by taking 1,000 random
draws from the asymptotic distribution of A0,
A1, ... , A6, C, and, for each draw, computing
the statistic whose standard error is desired.
The reported standard-error bands give the
point estimate plus or minus 1.96 times the
statistic’s standard error across the 1,000 ran-
dom draws.
To generate Monte Carlo standard-error
bands in figure 6, our test of the expectations
hypothesis, we must estimate an eight-variable
VAR rather than the seven-variable VAR
described in the text.  The first six variables
are unchanged; the last two variables are the
one-month yield and the T-month yield, for T
ranging from two months through 29 years.
That is, the VARs now include EM, PCED,
CHGSMP, FF, NBR, TR, Y 1, and Y T, T  > 1.
Thus, 48 VARs were estimated, each with a
different maturity’s yield as the eighth vari-
able.  We use this modified VAR to calculate
within a single model the difference between
the first step response of Yt
T and the average of
the first T-period ahead responses of the one-
month rate.  The standard errors are then com-
puted using 1,000 Monte Carlo draws, as de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph.  Note that
the point estimate of the difference can also be
estimated using the results from the seven
variable VARs, which offers a good check of
the eight-variable VAR method.  The results
are robust.
NOTES
1We use zero-coupon bonds to avoid the ambiguous
impact of coupons on bond-price fluctuations.  In particu-
lar, the effect of interest rates on bond prices (and there-
fore on holding period returns) depends both on the
bond’s maturity and on its coupon rate.  Two ten-year
bonds with different coupon rates will respond differently
to a given interest rate shock.  The behavior of one-year
holding period returns for coupon bonds with durations of
four, six, and ten years would be approximated by the
plots in figure 1.
2A third direction of causality would be that an exoge-
nous increase in yields induces a tight-money response
by the Fed.
3See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b),
and Eichenbaum and Evans (1992).
4Our use of the term “feedback rule” follows Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994b).  It should be clear,
however, that the feedback rule is not a “law” and that
there are no penalties for deviating from it.  Rather, the
feedback rule should be thought of as a set of quantitative
relations that summarize the policymakers’ normal re-
sponse to economic developments.
5The variable CHGSMP is constructed by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.  It  measures the change in a compos-
ite index based on two sensitive materials price series, the
producer price index of 28 sensitive crude and intermedi-
ate materials and the spot market price index of industrial
raw materials.
6In particular, the price level displays a sustained rise
following a monetary contraction.
7In this study, YT always denotes the continuously
compounded yield to maturity.  If yT is the simple yield,
then the continuously compounded yield is defined as
log (1 + yT).
8McCulloch and Kwon (1993) provide yields on zero-
coupon bonds for maturities through 40 years, but
because of significant missing data, only rates through
29 years are used in our analysis.  There are rates for
monthly maturities from one to 18 months, then quarterly
to two years, then semiannually to three years, and then
annually to 29 years. All rates are annual percentage returns
on a continuously compounded basis and are derived from
a tax-adjusted cubic spline discount function, as described
in McCulloch (1975).  A more detailed explanation can be
found in McCulloch and Kwon (1993).
9Other than the bond yields, all data are from the Federal
Reserve’s macroeconomic database.  The series are
monthly from 1959–95 and are seasonally adjusted where
appropriate.
10The precise magnitude of a one-standard-deviation
shock depends on the particular model, as follows:
one-month rate, 50-basis-point shock; six-month rate,
49-basis-point shock; one-year rate, 48-basis-point shock;
three-year rate, 49-basis-point shock; ten-year rate, 53-
basis-point shock; and 15-year rate, 53-basis-point shock.
11Standard-error bands were calculated using the Monte
Carlo procedure outlined in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1994), with 1,000 Monte Carlo draws.  The tech-
nical appendix describes this procedure in greater detail.
12To our knowledge, Irving Fisher never made the asser-
tion implied by the hypothesis bearing his name.  Fisher
did note that if two risk-free interest rates are denominat-
ed in terms of different numeraires, they could differ only
by the difference between the rates-of-change in the value
of the numeraire goods.  To derive the “Fisher hypothe-
sis,” one must combine Fisher’s insight with the strong
hypothesis that the real risk-free rate is constant, or at
least uncorrelated with the inflation rate.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
13See Marshall (1992) and the references therein.
14This initial rise in the price level is somewhat counter-
intuitive.  One explanation is that the Fed uses informa-
tion to forecast inflation that we have not included in our
model.  Since monetary policy affects the price level with
some delay, the initial effect of a monetary tightening is to
provide information that the Fed is forecasting future
inflation.  If these forecasts are accurate, on average, the
initial response of the price level will be to rise.   See
Eichenbaum (1992) and Sims (1992) for further discus-
sion of this issue.
15A decomposition of the monetary policy instrument
when the one-month yield is included differs from the
decomposition that includes the six-month yield because
these are two distinct models of the monetary policy rule.
We find that the decompositions with yields longer than
six months have the same qualitative behavior as the
decomposition using the six-month yield.
16A similar pattern obtains for all maturities longer than
six months.  For these longer maturities, the shocks to the
yield tend to pull the federal funds rate below the expect-
ed path after March 1995.  However, the exogenous
monetary policy shocks also offset this effect.
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Management efficiency
in minority- and women-
owned banks
Iftekhar Hasan
and William C. Hunter
Studies of the differences in
operating performance of mi-
nority- and nonminority-
owned commercial banks date
back to the 1970s and early
1980s.1  The focal point of much of this research
was to investigate the long-term viability of
minority-owned institutions.  Some studies
investigated declining lending trends among
minority institutions (Boorman and Kwast 1974
and Meinster and Elyasiani 1988), while others
concerned the possible adverse consequences of
these trends on the economic development of
the inner cities (for example, Kwast and Black
1983).  As more attention is devoted to econom-
ic development prospects in our nation’s core
urban centers, the question of what role minori-
ty-owned banks (and other specially designated
banks, including those owned by women) might
play in the economic development of these
communities naturally arises.2
Studies comparing the economic perfor-
mance of minority- and nonminority-owned
banks, for the most part, have revealed that
the minority-owned banks have tended to be
smaller, somewhat less profitable, and more
expenditure prone than comparable groups of
nonminority banks (Colby 1993).  In addition,
earlier studies reported that minority-owned
banks tended to operate with lower ratios of
equity capital to assets, to employ more con-
servative asset portfolio management policies,
and to post higher loan losses than their non-
minority peers (Brimmer 1971, Boorman and
Kwast 1974, Bates and Bradford 1980, and
Kwast 1981).
In contrast to these negative findings, a
more recent study by Meinster and Elyasiani
(1988) found that minority-owned banks had
significantly improved their capital ratios and
decreased their holdings of liquid assets, while
expanding their use of purchased funds.  The
authors also reported that there were no signifi-
cant differences in the pricing and asset-liability
management decisions in the overall financial
performance of minority-owned banks com-
pared with a sample of nonminority-owned
banks.  However, Meinster and Elyasiani ob-
served that banks owned by African Americans
continued to reflect the financial performance
characteristics associated with minority-owned
bank performance in the 1960s and 1970s.
Caution must be exercised when compar-
ing minority-owned with nonminority-owned
banks on the basis of broadly defined markets
or locational attributes.  Studies by Clair
(1988), Hunter (1978), and Mehdian and Elya-
siani (1992) suggest that only when the two
sets of banks are operating in identical or very
similar market areas (in terms of economic and
demographic characteristics) with similar cus-
tomer bases is it safe to attribute differences in
operating performance to differences in owner-
ship and/or customer ethnicity.
Given the inherent difficulty in construct-
ing samples of minority- and nonminority-
owned banks which serve identical market
Iftekhar Hasan is an associate professor of finance
at the New Jersey Institute of Technology (SIM).
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areas, it is not surprising to find mixed conclu-
sions in the literature assessing the long-term
viability of minority-owned banks as engines
of community economic development.3
In this article, we follow an approach
similar in spirit to that used by Mehdian and
Elyasiani (1992) in conducting an analysis of
the operating performance of minority- and
women-owned banks and comparable nonmi-
nority-owned banks from the perspective of
production efficiency.4  Instead of simply com-
paring the operating performance of a distinct
sample of minority- and women-owned banks
with a distinct sample of nonminority-owned
banks, we compare the operating performance
of our minority and nonminority sample banks
relative to a set of so-called best-practice
banks.  This set of best-practice banks, which
can include all types of banks regardless of
ownership, represents those institutions which
produce their financial products and services at
the lowest cost using the most efficient mix of
productive inputs or factors of production.
Thus, unlike the older literature which infers
managerial inefficiencies for minority-owned
banks from simple comparisons of financial
ratios, this article measures such managerial
inefficiencies directly from the banks’ cost
(production) functions.  We are thus able to
determine which banks—various categories of
minority- or women-owned and nonminority-
owned—are more efficiently managed.5
Much of the literature examining the per-
formance of minority banks is descriptive or
based on regression analyses which lack well-
developed theoretical underpinnings.  In this
article, we use production theory and modern
econometric procedures to extract information
on managerial efficiency in the production of
financial services.  Essentially, we estimate a
firm-specific management efficiency measure
for each bank in our sample using a standard
bank cost function.  As suggested by the earlier
literature comparing the operating performance
of minority- and nonminority-owned banks,
differences in management efficiency among
our sample banks could be due to a host of fac-
tors.  Differences in managerial efficiency could
result from differences in operating strategies,
organizational structures, primary market areas,
or customer bases.  Below, we attempt to identi-
fy some of the determinants of observed mana-
gerial inefficiencies in our sample banks.
The empirical approach
In carrying out our empirical analysis, we
use the methodology developed by Aigner et
al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977)—
the stochastic cost frontier approach (described
briefly below)—to calculate a measure of pro-
duction efficiency (an inefficiency score) for
each bank in our sample.  These scores are
used to gain further insight into the determi-
nants of inefficiency.
Following Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeus-
en and Broeck (1977), a firm’s cost function,
that is, the relationship among the firm’s total
cost of producing various products or services,
the products or services themselves, and the
prices of the inputs used to produce these prod-
ucts or services may be written as
1) TCf = f (Yi, Pk) + ef   f = 1, ..., n,
where TCf  represents the firm’s total costs, Yi
represents the various products or services
produced by the firm, Pk represents the prices
of the inputs used by the firm in the production
of the products or services, and e represents a
random disturbance term which allows the cost
function to vary stochastically, that is, it cap-
tures the fact that there is uncertainty regarding
the level of total costs that will be incurred for
given levels of production.  The uncertainty in
the cost function can be further decomposed in
the following manner:
2) ef  = Vf  + Uf .
In equation 2, V represents random un-
controllable factors that affect total costs
(such as weather, luck, labor strikes, or ma-
chine performance).  These factors (and their
impact on costs) are assumed to be indepen-
dent of each another.  They are identically
distributed as normal variates and the value of
the error term in the cost relationship is, on
average, equal to zero.
The U term in equation 2 represents firm-
specific cost deviations or errors which are due
to factors that are under the control of the man-
agement of the firm.  Such factors include the
quantity of labor, capital, or other inputs hired
or employed in the production of the firm’s
products and services and the amount chosen
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The stochastic frontier cost function ap-
proach maintains that managerial or controlla-
ble inefficiencies only increase costs above
frontier or best-practice levels, and that the
random fluctuations or uncontrollable factors
can either increase or decrease costs.  Since
uncontrollable factors are assumed to be sym-
metrically distributed, the frontier of the cost
function, f(Yi, Pk) + e, is clearly stochastic.  In
practical terms, the U component of the error
term in the cost function given by equation 2,
representing managerial inefficiency, causes
the cost of production to be above the frontier
or best-practice levels.  Jondrow et al. (1982)
estimated a firm’s relative inefficiency using
the ratio of the variability of the U and V
terms in equation 2, which is measured by the
ratio of the standard deviation Q = su / sv ,
where su  and sv are the standard deviations of
U and V. Small values of Q imply that the
uncontrollable factors dominate the controlla-
ble inefficiencies.
In summary, the stochastic frontier ap-
proach incorporates a two-component error
structure—one being a controllable factor and
the other a random uncontrollable component.
The controllable component consists of fac-
tors controllable by management.7
The cost function
To estimate the error term in the cost func-
tion given by equation 2 and to calculate each
bank’s efficiency index, we statistically fitted an
empirical cost function of the following form:
3) lnTCf = a0 + Sai lnYi + ½ SSaij lnYi lnYj
+ S bk lnPk+ ½ SS bkh lnPk lnPh
+ SS gik  lnYi lnPk + ef,
where TCf  represents total costs, Yi represents
the ith output, Pk represents the price of the kth
input, ef  is the disturbance term, and ln repre-
sents the natural logarithm.  The cost function
in equation 3 is a standard translog cost func-
tion.  In fitting this cost function, standard
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions were
imposed.8
The sample data and variable definitions
The data for each sample bank examined
were obtained from commercial bank “Re-
ports of condition and income” filed with
bank regulators.  Average data for the four
TABLE 1
Frequency distribution of sample banks
A. Minority-owned commercial banks
African Hispanic Asian Native
American Women American American American Total
Total 35 5 21 29 5 95
National
charter 11 3 10 11 3 38
State
charter 24 2 11 18 2 57
Bank holding
company 17 5 8 10 1 41
De novo
banks 3 0 0 7 0 10
Federal Reserve
member 13 4 11 14 3 45
B. Nonminority-owned commercial banks
National State Bank holding Federal Reserve
Total charter charter company De novo member
127 66 61 59 6 82
Source:  Federal Reserve Board of Governors, “Report of condition and income 1992,” Washington, DC, magnetic
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quarters of 1992 was used.  The sample was
composed of all minority and women’s banks
and a comparable sample of nonminority-
owned banks operating in 1992.  The selec-
tion of comparable nonminority banks was
based on size, location, market served, and
start-up date.  Initially, a nonminority-owned
bank of similar size, established in the same
year, with its headquarters in the same city as
each sample minority or women’s bank was
identified.  In cases where comparable banks
could not be located, we expanded the search
to encompass the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) of the minority- or women-owned
sample bank.  If we were unable to find a
match in the same MSA, we selected an insti-
tution from a similar MSA market within the
same state.  This selection procedure resulted
in a total of 127 banks being classified as
comparable nonminority institutions.  Panels
A and B of table 1 provide data on the charac-
teristics of the groups of banks.
Variable definitions
In the empirical cost function in equation
3, total costs (TC) were defined to include all
labor and physical capital expenses, as well as
the interest expense incurred by the bank, that
is, the total costs of inputs used to produce the
bank’s various outputs.  Four outputs were
included in the cost function and were mea-
sured as the dollar value of (1) all money
market assets, Ym; (2) commercial and indus-
trial loans, Yc; (3) other loans, Yl; and (4)
other bank outputs, Yo, which were proxied by
annual noninterest income service charges,
excluding gains and losses on foreign ex-
change transactions.
Labor, physical capital, and funds (includ-
ing deposits) were treated as inputs used in the
production of bank assets.  With respect to
input prices, the price of labor, P1, was calcu-
lated by dividing total salaries and fringe bene-
fits by the number of full-time equivalent em-
ployees (including bank officers).  The price of
physical capital, P2, was defined to be equal to
the ratio of total expenses for premises and
fixed assets to total assets.  The price of funds,
P3, was computed by taking the ratio of total
interest expense (paid on deposits, federal
funds purchased, securities sold under agree-
ments to repurchase, demand notes issued to
the U.S. Treasury, mortgage indebtedness,
TABLE 2
Mean values of key ratios
Non- All African Hispanic Asian Native
minority minority American Women American American American
Commercial
loans 12.41 11.92 11.16** 17.00** 11.71 25.31*** 10.32
Residential
mortgage loans 18.17 13.57*** 13.89*** 7.88** 11.57*** 10.91** 12.30**
Liquid assets 33.17 36.07 35.78 41.19** 41.48** 23.59*** 45.68**
Delinquent assets 1.51 1.46 1.49 1.03* 1.05* 2.04** 1.15
Time deposits 40.19 43.48 42.75 33.52* 44.09 48.02** 48.49**
Retail deposits 13.12 14.49 13.93 7.12** 11.78 11.91 9.48
Interest expenses 2.97 3.08* 2.98 3.04 3.09* 3.10* 2.87
Noninterest
operating
expenses 4.01 4.33*** 4.92*** 4.17** 4.72** 4.97*** 4.57**
Return on assets .554 .485 .681**  .948** .821** –.309*** .568
Return on equity 5.91 5.78 7.41*** 9.39** 9.61*** –.023*** 5.53
Equity 9.03 8.86 7.83 7.87 7.48 11.15* 8.62
***, **, and * are significantly different from nonminority banks at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
Note:  All ratios except return on assets and return on equity are relative to total assets.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
subordinated debts and debentures, and other
borrowed money) to the sum of total funds.
Empirical results
Table 2 provides some key balance-sheet
and income expenditure ratios for the sample
banks in our study.  When minority- and
women-owned banks were grouped in one
category, called all minority, their asset portfo-
lios and financing strategies were similar to
those of nonminority banks, for the most part,
except for a lower ratio of residential mortgage
loans to total assets.  In addition, the two
groups’ mean return on assets (ROA) and mean
return on equity (ROE) were not significantly
different.  However, while African-American-
owned banks had almost identical asset and
financial statistics to those of nonminority
banks, other minority- and women-owned
banks were quite different from nonminority
banks.  Women-owned banks, for example, had
higher ratios of commercial loans and liquid
assets to total assets than nonminority-owned
banks, but lower ratios of residential mort-
gage loans to total assets.  They also posted
lower ratios of time deposits and retail depos-
its to total assets than nonminority banks.  On
the other hand, Asian-American-owned banks
had higher ratios of commercial loans and
delinquent assets to total assets than nonminor-
ity-owned banks, as well as higher ratios of
time deposits to total deposits.  These banks
also posted lower ratios of residential mort-
gage loans and liquid assets to total assets
than nonminority-owned banks.  In terms of
profitability, the Asian-American-owned
banks experienced negative returns over the
sample period, while the other minority- and
women-owned banks showed positive returns.
The descriptive statistics also show a sig-
nificant difference in both the interest and
noninterest operating expense categories be-
tween the groups of banks.  The minority- and
women-owned banks posted significantly high-
er ratios of noninterest operating expenses to
total assets than did the nonminority banks.
With respect to the ratio of interest expenses
 to total assets, all minority-owned banks again
posted significantly higher ratios.  However,
among the minority- and women-owned banks,
only the Hispanic-American and Asian-Ameri-
can banks had higher ratios of interest expens-
es to total assets.
Table 3 presents statistics for the variables
used to estimate the cost function in equation 3.
The input prices of minority- and women-
owned banks exhibited a mixed pattern com-
pared with those of the nonminority banks.
TABLE 3
Means for variables used in translog cost function
As a percent As a percent
Nonminority of assets Minority of assets
Cost function inputs
Price of labor 35.79 (16.83) — 31.99* (7.12) —
Price of capital 2.54 (1.88) — 3.17** (3.21) —
Price of funds .036 (.017) — .032 (.007) —
Cost function outputs (mil.)
All money market assets 29.15 (48.95) 26.11 (16.10) 33.81 (70.05) 28.36 (15.70)
Commercial/industrial loans 12.93 (49.21) 12.41 (9.91) 14.45 (37.38) 11.97 (7.89)
Other loans 18.11 (79.37) 17.97 (30.04) 16.52 (65.43) 11.06** (28.12)
Other bank products
   and services 1.85 (7.61) 1.75 (7.50) 1.66 (4.10) 1.45* (1.01)
Total assets (mil.) 102.3 (192.7) — 120.8* (23.3) —
Total costs (mil.) 7.54 (12.99) 7.87 (6.57) 8.43* (14.68) 7.80* (1.80)
**, * Difference in means significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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While the price of funds at all of the sample
banks was similar, the prices paid for capital
inputs by minority- and women-owned banks
were significantly higher, on average, than
those paid by the nonminority banks.  On the
other hand, the prices paid for labor inputs
were significantly lower at the minority- and
women-owned banks.  Despite this difference,
total measured costs were significantly higher
at the minority- and women-owned banks.  In
terms of asset allocation, the nonminority
banks had a higher percentage of assets in
commercial and industrial loans, other loans,
and other bank products and services, but
operated with a lower percentage of assets
in the money market category than did the
minority- and women-owned banks.
Management inefficiency
Higher capital input prices at minority-
and women-owned institutions relative to the
control group suggest inefficiency, particularly
in light of the more liquid asset portfolios held
by the minority- and women-owned banks.
Using the parameter values and standard
errors of the residuals obtained from estimating
a normalized version of the translog cost func-
tion in equation 3, inefficiency scores for the
sample banks were calculated.  The descriptive
statistics displayed in table 4 suggest that both
groups of banks produced products and servic-
es at a higher cost than necessary, that is, a
perfectly efficient bank would have an ineffi-
ciency index of zero.  The average inefficiency
score of the minority- and women-owned
banks was higher (31.4 percent) than the aver-
age inefficiency score of the nonminority-
owned banks (24.8 percent) and the difference
was statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.  Thus, on average, it appears that the
minority- and women-owned banks were rela-
tively inefficient institutions.
 Asian-American-owned banks experi-
enced the highest level of inefficiency (36.2
percent), followed by African-American
(34.8 percent), Hispanic-American (33.1 per-
cent), and Native-American banks (32.0 per-
cent).  Banks owned by women were more
efficient than any of the other minority-owned
banks but less efficient than the average non-
minority bank.  The results also indicated that
the holding company structure was the most
efficient structure for the minority- and wom-
en-owned banks.  This could be the result of
difficulties encountered by minority- and wom-
en-owned banks that are not affiliated with
holding companies in adapting customer and
TABLE 4
Inefficiency score for sample banks
Inefficiency score
Standard
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Nonminority banks .248 .192 .056 .914
Minority banks .314* .105 .068 .966
African-American banks .348* .093 .032 .902
Women’s banks .267* .168 .041 .925
Hispanic-American banks .331* .126 .035 .936
Asian-American banks .362** .110 .069 .955
Native-American banks .320* .098 .046 .928
National chartered banks .318* .108 .037 .944
State chartered banks .320* .112 .050 .958
Bank holding companies .302** .083 .074 .903
De novo banks .347* .148 .062 .941
Federal Reserve institutions .332* .130 .048 .921
Combined sample 2.710 .182 .035 .966
**, * Significantly different from nonminority sample banks at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
service delivery systems in unique markets.  It
could also be due simply to a lack of manageri-
al experience at these banks.
The relationship between firm inefficiency
and bank characteristics was estimated using
the following Tobit regression model:9
Ui = ao + b1MINORITY + b2LIQUID
ASSET + b3COMMERCIAL LOAN +
b4RETAIL DEPOSIT +b5ASSET +
b6BHC + b7DE NOVO + b8NATIONAL
+ b9 3-FIRM + b10FEDMEMB + ei,
        where Ui = individual bank’s inefficiency score,
MINORITY = minority- or women-owned indicator
variable (1 for minority- and wom-
en-owned banks and 0 otherwise),
LIQUID
ASSET = ratio of liquid assets to total assets,
COMMER-
CIAL LOAN = ratio of commercial loans to total
assets,
RETAIL
DEPOSIT = ratio of retail deposits to total
deposits,
ASSET = total assets,
BHC = bank holding company dummy
(1 if the financial institution is some
form of bank holding company
and 0 otherwise),
DE NOVO = de novo banks (1 for banks estab-
lished within the last three years
and 0 otherwise),
NATIONAL = national or state charter (1 for
national chartered and 0 for state
chartered banks),
3-FIRM = three firm deposit concentration
ratio of respective metropolitan
statistical market, and
FEDMEMB =  Federal Reserve membership
(1 for members and 0 otherwise).
In examining the determinants of ineffi-
ciency among the sample banks, we included
variables related to portfolio composition
(COMMERCIAL LOAN) and liquidity
(LIQUID ASSET), financing or funding sourc-
es (RETAIL DEPOSIT), organizational char-
acteristics [for example, whether the bank was
a member of the Federal Reserve System
(FEDMEMB) or organized as a holding com-
pany (BHC)], charter type (NATIONAL), mar-
ket concentration (3-FIRM), and whether the
sample bank was a de novo bank (DE NOVO).
While it is difficult to state a priori how
each of these factors will influence bank ineffi-
ciency, it seems reasonable to expect de novo
banks to be less efficient than other banks, and
banks operating in concentrated markets to be
less efficient than those operating in very com-
petitive markets.
The regression results presented in table 5
show that the coefficient on the minority/wom-
en ownership dummy variable was positive and
statistically significant.  This implies that these
banks were less efficient than their nonminori-
ty counterparts.  Lending in the commercial
and industrial loan category was also found to
be associated with higher levels of inefficien-
cy, while the bank holding company organiza-
tional structure was found to be associated with
lower levels of inefficiency.  As was expected,
newly established banks tended to be less effi-
cient than other banks and banks operating in
less competitive markets tended to be less
efficient than banks operating in more compet-
itive, less concentrated markets.
Conclusion
Management efficiency has always been
an important topic in banking research.  Previ-
ous studies comparing the operating perfor-
mance of minority- and women-owned banks
with that of nonminority banks often reached
mixed conclusions.  This may have been due to
the difficulty of identifying groups of minority
and nonminority banks that are comparable
along such dimensions as size and customer
base.  This article reported on the results of
research which examined differences in the
operating performance of minority- and wom-
en-owned banks from the viewpoint of produc-
tion efficiency.  Instead of simply comparing
the operating performance of a distinct sample
of minority- and women-owned banks with a
distinct sample of nonminority-owned banks,
we compared the operating performance of all
of our sample banks relative to a set of best-
practice banks.  This set of best-practice banks,
including all types of sampled banks regardless
of ownership ethnicity or gender, represents
those institutions that produced their financial
products and services at the lowest cost using
the most efficient mix of productive inputs or
factors of production.  Thus, unlike the older
literature which suggests managerial ineffi-
ciencies for minority-owned banks from simpleFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 27
Regression analysis
Dependent variable: inefficiency score
TABLE 5
Independent
variables Coefficient Standard error
Intercept .149 .024**
Minority .058 .032*
Liquid asset –.188 .112
Commercial loan .060 .036*
Retail deposit .132 .097
Asset –4.7E-6 6.7E-6
BHC –.073 .038**




Equation                              Chi-Square  = 142.06 * d.f. = 211
***, **, and * are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).
Tobit
The results of our analysis indi-
cated that, on average, while
banks from both the minority-
and women-owned and the non-
minority categories were ineffi-
cient, the average minority- or
women-owned bank was signifi-
cantly more inefficient than the
average nonminority bank.
Among the sampled minority-
and women-owned banks, the
women-owned banks were the
most efficient.  Banks owned by
Asian Americans were the least
efficient among the minority-
owned banks, followed by banks
owned by African Americans
and Hispanic Americans, respec-
tively.  De novo status was found
to be a key factor accounting for
higher levels of inefficiency.
One explanation for this finding
could be the lack of experience at
de novo banks in serving new
markets and customer bases.
Another factor found to be important in deter-
mining the level of inefficiency among the
sampled banks was the level of market concen-
tration.  The less competitive and more concen-
trated the bank’s local market, the higher its
level of inefficiency.
comparisons of financial ratios, we measured
such managerial inefficiencies directly from
the banks’ cost (production) functions.
We examined the performance of a sample
of minority- and women-owned and nonminor-
ity-owned banks operating during 1992.
NOTES
1In this article, minority-owned banks include those
owned by African Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, and Asian Americans.  For a summary
of history and trends in minority ownership of commer-
cial banks see Price (1990).
2The recent controversy surrounding the acquisition of
Indecorp, a leading Chicago minority-owned bank by
ShoreBank Corporation, a nonminority-owned bank
known internationally for its development efforts, is a
case in point.  See Wilke (1995).
3In this regard, Dahl (1995) offers a methodology which
can potentially resolve this sample matching problem and,
thus, contribute to our understanding of the observed
differences in the operating performance of minority- and
nonminority-owned commercial banks.
4Meinster and Elyasiani (1988) analyzed the 1984 year-
end performance of a sample of 80 minority and 80
nonminority banks using a nonparametric efficiency
technique—data envelopment analysis—based on linear
programming principles.  This technique assumes that all
deviations from the best-practice cost frontier—including
those due to random uncontrollable factors—are due to
inefficient management.  The stochastic frontier cost
function approach used in this article does not assign
deviations from the frontier caused by random uncontrol-
lable factors to inefficient management.
5Research to date suggests that differences in managerial
ability to control costs or maximize revenues account for
as much as 20 percent of banking costs, while scale and
scope inefficiencies account for only about 5 percent of
costs.  Thus, it is important to determine if there are
significant managerial efficiency differences among banks
owned by different ethnic and gender groups to draw
more useful conclusions on long-term viability issues.
See Berger et al. (1993).
6This inefficiency term is derived from a zero-mean
normal, N(0,su
2), distribution truncated below zero.  See
Aigner et al. (1977) for a discussion and derivation of the
cost function and error term structure given in equation 2.
7See Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1993) for a
related estimation technique applied to thrift institutions.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 28
8Symmetry requires that aij = bji and ahk =  bkh.  The
duality of the firm’s cost and production function was
preserved by imposing the following conditions:
Sbk = 1, Sbhk = 0, and Sgik = 0.
9The Tobit regression model was used to eliminate the
possibility of biased ordinary least square estimates where
the dependent variable and error terms in the regression
format are truncated normal variables (Amemiya 1973).
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